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This paper presents the results of an empirical research that sought to estimate 
the impact of poverty on the Brazilian School Performance Index – IDEB – for 
elementary schools in more than 5,500 Brazilian municipalities, comparing the 
performance of state and municipal schools. The investigation examines IDEB data 
for 2005, 2007, and 2009 through simple linear regressions, residue analysis, and 
partial correlation analysis. The results showed that poverty has a strong impact 
in students’ performance, explaining up to 60 percent of the variation of IDEB 
scores. The authors discuss the results vis-à-vis the current trend in educational 
policies, such as those based on input factors and teachers’ accountability, pointing 
out their shortcomings.
EDUCATIONAL POLICIES • MUNICIPALITIES • POVERTY • BRAZIL
This article presents the 
initial results of surveys 
carried out within the 
Center for Studies in Centro 
de Estudos da Cultura 
Contemporânea – CEDEC 
[Contemporary Culture], 
funded by the Brazilian 
Ministry of Education’s  
Anísio Teixeira Institute for 
Educational Studies and 
Research – INEP.
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NE ISSUE WITHIN CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ON EDUCATION seems to have achieved 
consensus both among researchers and policy makers: the problem of 
access to basic education has virtually been solved in most developing 
countries, and the challenge now is to enhance the quality of the teaching 
and learning process (WINKLER, GERSHBERG, 2000; HANUSHEK, 
WÖßMANN, 2007). This  new  consensus  has  had a profound impact on 
policies devoted to Education worldwide, and not only among developing 
or “emerging” countries, since central  to  their  policies  have  become 
the  evaluation of school performance, understood as the main indicator 
of quality of education. In the last 20 years, the United Kingdom and the 
United States have adopted strategies associating the accountability of 
teachers and managers with market mechanisms, leading to competition 
between public and private teaching institutions for government resources 
(RAVITCH, 2010; TOMLINSON, 2005). In Brazil, although we have only 
recently made access to primary and middle school universal, the issue of 
quality is increasingly driving the debates on educational policies. 
This change in emphasis has also been reflected in educational 
research. In the last 20 years, hundreds of studies have been conducted 
in order to identify which school-related factors have impact school 
performance, but the results have been inconclusive (HANUSHEK, 2003, 
1995). The effect of so-called input factors – teacher qualification, class 
size, infrastructure and the like – on school performance has not proven 
consistent, but varies according to the context in which the studies were 
conducted and the degree of aggregation of the variables that are taken 
into consideration. However, one factor has proven consistent in its 
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impact on school performance: the socio-economic conditions of students’ 
families. One of the best-known studies of its impact on school performance 
was the Coleman Report in the 1960s, which published the results of a 
comprehensive and detailed study into factors affecting performance 
in American schools (COLEMAN et al., 1966). The researchers applied 
statistical controls to eliminate the effect of families’ social and economic 
characteristics and concluded that school features had a very small impact 
on students’ performance. In other words, the family’s socio-economic 
background proved to be the factor best explaining school performance, 
while other factors such as the number of students per class, teacher 
qualifications, school equipment, and so on, proved not to be significant. 
Since then several studies have confirmed the results of the Coleman 
Report. Strangely, however, educational policies in the USA – as well as the 
United Kingdom –have sought to promote school performance through 
interventions in input factors, above all through the accountability of 
schools and teachers. The situation is scarcely different in other countries. 
In the case of Brazil, after the emergence of performance indicators, several 
states and municipalities adopted accountability policies; however, very 
little is known about the effect of these policies in the medium and long-
term (BROOKE, 2008). In any case, the impact of families’ socio-economic 
background has not been taken into consideration in such policies.
Another issue with implications for the current debate on 
educational policies in Brazil is the role of decentralization. Some analysts 
have stated that decentralization has a positive impact on the quality of 
education. These authors feel that decentralization may increase parents’ 
participation in, and control over, educational services, particularly 
when combined with market mechanisms (HANUSHEK, 2003; WEST, 
1997; WINKLER, GERSHBERG, 2000). However, critics of this perspective 
argue that the decentralization of education – above all in the developing 
world – has merely been a corollary of structural adjustment programs 
promoted by the World Bank, often clashing with its  declared goal of 
combating poverty (BONAL, 2004; CARNOY, 1997; KAMAT, 2002). In turn, 
critics of the  educational  reforms in the United Kingdom and the USA 
have argued that in these countries, they  have entailed greater central 
government control over schools, despite the rhetoric on the promotion 
of autonomy (TOMLINSON, 2005). Winkler and Gershberg (2000) believe 
that decentralization can enhance the quality of teaching in developing 
countries but admit that it is hard to check whether there has actually 
been a positive impact. The difficulty is threefold: firstly, developing 
countries often lack information on school performance and indicators of 
school quality; secondly, the results of educational policies appear slowly in 
response to interventions; and thirdly, it is not easy to control the effects of 
“external shocks” (natural catastrophes, teachers’ strikes, financial crises, 
leadership changes, and so on). For this reason, the authors have decided 
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to assess the impact of decentralization on education in some countries 
by analyzing factors that characterize high-performance schools, such as 
strong leadership, highly qualified teachers, staff dedication and a focus 
on results. However, this indirect approach is not satisfactory since, as 
we have noted, there is no established consensus as to which features of 
schools have a significant impact on the quality of education. 
The issue of decentralization in education in Brazil must therefore 
be addressed using different assumptions. First of all, central government 
has played a small role in delivering basic education in Brazil since the 
twentieth century, and this responsibility has been taken on by the states. 
Federal regulation has always been present, but since the enactment of the 
Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação Nacional – LDB [National Education 
Foundations and Guidelines Act] (BRASIL, 1996a), states and municipalities 
have gained greater autonomy in preparing curricula. Decentralization in 
education in Brazil may thus be best understood as “municipalization”. 
Universal access to education, promoted since 1997 by means of the Fundo 
de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental e de Valorização 
do Magistério – FUNDEF [Primary Education Funding System], has created 
strong incentives for the municipalization of educação fundamental [primary 
and middle school] (BRASIL, 1996a, 1996b). As we shall see in detail below, 
despite the FUNDEF incentives, the provisions of the Constitution (BRASIL, 
1988) and the LDB, the municipalizing process of fundamental education 
is not yet complete.
In this article, we seek to assess the process of municipalization of 
primary and middle school from the point of view of the impact of poverty 
on school performance. We pose the following questions: (a) what is the 
impact of poverty on the performance of the municipal schools vis-à-vis 
State schools? (b) Are there municipalities that stand out because of their 
ability to overcome the constraints imposed by poverty and thus achieve 
good school performance? (c) What input factors can explain the school 
performance of Brazilian municipalities? We have adopted three statistical 
techniques to answer these questions: regression analysis, residual analysis, 
and partial correlation analysis. These questions, however, are not the 
whole story: results must be evaluated in the light of the contemporary 
debate on educational policies. In the next section, we therefore present 
and discuss the results of the statistical analyses; in the following one, we 
reflect on the implications of these results for educational policy in Brazil 
and, lastly, we conclude with some final remarks.
POVERTY, MUNICIPALIZATION AND 
SCHOOL PERFORMANCE
FUNDEF, which came into force in 1997, proved an efficient mechanism 
for promoting enhanced enrollments in fundamental education, as data 
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before and after its introduction show. In 1, 86.6% of 7-to-14-year-old 
children were enrolled in school; in 2007, this rose to 97% (HENRIQUES 
et al., 2009; SILVA, ALCÂNTARA, 2009). In the north-east of Brazil, the 
country’s poorest region, enrollments for this age group rose from 75% 
in 1991 to 96% in 2002 (DE MELLO, HOPPE, 2005). However, although 
Brazil has virtually made access to school universal, it is estimated 
that only 60% of students enrolling in the first year complete the eight 
years of compulsory education (fundamental education”) (HENRIQUES, 
GIAMBIAGI, VELOSO, 2009). 
FUNDEF, however, has not had a positive impact on students’ 
school performance, as Sistema de Avaliação da Educação Básica – SAEB 
[Basic Education Evaluation System] results show. As it can be seen in the 
graph shown in figure 1, the performance of students completing the 
4th and 8th grades fell after the introduction of FUNDEF, with a trend 
toward recovery beginning in 2001. It should be noted that in the smaller 
and poorer municipalities, FUNDEF has led to a more rapid increase 
in enrollments than observed in medium and large municipalities (DE 
MELLO, HOPPE, 2005). In itself, this information shows that the fall in 
school performance is due to the impact of poverty. Increased enrollments 
in small towns brought millions of children from low-income families 
into the school system for the first time. As we shall see below, the fall 
in school performance was greater in municipal than in state schools, 
precisely because the former received the larger contingent of students 
from poor families. This backs up the argument over the strong impact 
of socio-economic background on school performance found in studies 
carried out in other countries (ERMISCH, FRANCESCONI, 2001; LEE, 
BARRO, 2001; HANUSHEK, 1995; COLEMAN et al., 1966).
FIGURE 1
AVERAgE PERFORMANCE IN SAEB, 1995-2005
4th year, Portuguese 8th year, Portuguese
4th year, Mathematic 8th year, Mathematic
Source: Brasil, 2007.
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Thanks to the availability of data for the Índice de Desenvolvimento 
da Educação Básica – IDEB [Basic Education Development Index] from 
2005, educational performance can be consulted for virtually all of Brazil’s 
municipalities. IDEB is a compound index calculated for three periods: 
from the 1st to the 4th year, from the 5th to the 8th year and at the end of 
the 3rd year of secondary education. It ranges from 0 to 10, and includes 
two indicators: standardized grades for tests of mathematics and reading 
(Prova Brasil), and the average pass rate (FERNANDES, 2007). Linking these 
two components, IDEB expresses a compensating mechanism between 
exam performance and pass rate. A 10% fall in the average pass rate 
must thus be counterbalanced by a 10% rise in the average examination 
performance for IDEB to remain constant.
Table 1 shows IDEB results for fundamental education in Brazil 
for the three data-gathering waves: 2005, 2007 and 2009, as well as 
projections by INEP (see above), an agency of the Ministério da Educação – 
MEC [Ministry of Education]. INEP’s performance goal is to achieve an 
overall Brazilian average score for IDEB of 6.0 at the end of the 4th year, 
which is considered equivalent to the average performance of students 
in developed countries as measured by PISA (FERNANDES, 2008). Actual 
results both for state and municipal schools, except for private schools, 
exceed the goals established for 2007 and 2009.
TABLE 1 
RESULTS AND PROJECTIONS FOR IDEB, 4TH and 8TH YEARS
ideB 4TH YEAR ideB 8TH YEAR
ideB  
observed
goals ideB  
observed
goals
Year/Wave 2005 2007 2009 2007 2009 2021 2005 2007 2009 2007 2009 2021
Public 3,6 4,0 4,4 3,6 4,0 5,8 3,2 3,5 3,7 3,3 3,4 5,2
state 3,9 4,3 4,9 4,0 4,3 6,1 3,3 3,6 3,8 3,3 3,5 5,3
Municipal 3,4 4,0 4,4 3,5 3,8 5,7 3,1 3,4 3,6 3,1 3,3 5,1
Private 5,9 6,0 6,4 6,0 6,3 7,5 5,8 5,8 5,9 5,8 6,0 7,3
ToTaL 3,8 4,2 4,6 3,9 4,2 6,0 3,5 3,8 4,0 3,5 3,7 5,5
Note: Shaded cells show years where the goals were exceeded.
Source: Inep (BRASIL, s.d.[a]).
Table 2, in turn, shows the number of municipalities in the IDEB 
database for the 2009 data-gathering exercise. As it can be seen, although 
municipalization has advanced by the 4th year, it has not advanced 
significantly for the 5th to the 8th-year period. For education up to the 
fourth year, municipalization has been completed in nearly 40% of the 
municipalities; for 5th to 8th-year education, municipalization has been 
completed in only 12.9% of municipalities. Most municipalities continue 
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to deliver fundamental education through municipal and state schools 
both for the 1st to 4th year group and for the 5th to 8th-year group – 
52.6% and 47.1%, respectively.
TABLE 2 
NUMBER OF MUNICIPALITIES AND TYPES OF SCHOOL IN THE BIg DATABASE 
WITH IDEB SCORES (REFERENCE YEAR: 2009)
1sT a 4TH YEAR 5TH a 8TH YEAR
Municipal 
schools 
(MS)
state 
schools 
(SS)
MS and SS Municipal schools
state 
schools MS and SS
2.200 413 2.900 713 2.218 2.614
39,9% 7,5% 52,6% 12,9% 40% 47,1%
Total: 5.513 Total: 5.545
Note: The 2010 census records a total of 5,565 municipalities in Brazil (IBgE, 2010).
Source: Inep (Brasil. s.d. [a]).
SIMPLE LINEAR REgRESSION ANALYSIS
To measure the impact of poverty on school performance, we carried 
out simple regression analyses in which IDEB scores were the dependent 
variables, and the level of poverty in the municipality, as measured by 
the percentage of inhabitants of the municipality living on incomes 
lower than half of one minimum salary, was the independent ones. We 
also tested other  13 social variables that might have an impact on 
school performance in a major component analysis in order to arrive 
at one  and  single independent variable. This analysis resulted in two 
factors: variables expressing wealth/poverty and Theil’s inequality index. 
However, there is no clear linear correlation between IDEB scores and 
values for Theil’s index, as can be seen on analysis of the scatter chart. 
This is explained by the fact that thousands of Brazilian municipalities 
show low rates of inequality because they are uniformly poor. Simple 
regression with a single variable – the level of poverty in the municipality – 
thus proved most suitable for the purposes of this study. We can express 
the impact of poverty on school performance using this equation:
IDEBi (m4, m8, e4, e8) = β0 β1Pi (m4, m8, e4, e8) + εi 
where:
•	 IDEBi (m4, m8, e4, e8) is the predicted IDEB score for both types of 
school (m = municipal and e = state), and the two years considered 
(4th and 8th);
•	 Pi (m4, m8, e4, e8) is the percentage of impoverished individuals in 
each municipality, for the schools and years studied;
•	 β0 is the value of the constant, corresponding to the intercept of the 
straight line;
•	 β1 is the coefficient expressing the linear regression gradient; 
•	 εi is the estimated error.
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Table 3 shows values for R2, Beta (standardized coefficient) and 
t-test scores for simple linear regression corresponding to each type of 
school and year data. We can see that in all cases, there is a significant 
negative linear association between IDEB scores and the level of poverty 
in municipalities, in other words, the larger the number of individuals 
living below the poverty level in the municipality, the lower is the 
school performance. R2 and Beta values show that there is a greater 
impact of poverty on school performance in municipal schools up to 
the 4th year, and in 2005 more than 60% of variation in IDEB can be 
explained by the variation in the level of poverty in the municipality. 
Although this impact diminished after 2005, it was still strong in 2009 
(54%). In general, school performance in municipal schools is more 
strongly affected by poverty than performance in state schools. This 
result bears out the argument put forward above that the fall in school 
performance after 1997 occurred because of the inclusion of students 
from poorer families in the education system.
TABLE 3
RESULTS FOR R2, BETA AND T FOR SIMPLE LINEAR REgRESSIONS: IDEB 
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE) AND % OF POOR INDIVIDUALS RESIDINg IN THE 
MUNICIPALITY (INDEPENDENT VARIABLE)
4th YEAR 8th YEAR
Year r2 Beta t n** r2 Beta t n**
Municipal 
schools
2005 0,606 -0,779 -81,563* 4.326 0,447 -0,669 -44,396* 2.439
2007 0,582 -0,763 -82,962* 4.948 0,452 -0,672 -50,775 3.129
2009 0,543 -0,737 -76,499* 4.922 0,444 -0,666 -49,522* 3.075
state 
schools
2005 0,461 -0,679 -48,061* 2.706 0,384 -0,62 -52,303* 4.394
2007 0,441 -0,664 -49,072* 3.055 0,36 -0,6 -52,352* 4.699
2009 0,343 -0,585 -37,367* 2.681 0,305 -0,553 -44,568* 4.522
*p < 0.0001; **N = number of municipalities included in the analysis.
Source: Author’s elaboration.
RESIDUAL ANALYSIS
Are the municipalities able to overcome the limits imposed by poverty 
on school performance? In order to answer this question we analyzed 
the residues of linear regression for municipal schools using the IDEB 
results for the 4th year. This year was chosen not only because it was 
the most strongly impacted by the level of poverty, but also because in 
many places, municipalization of primary and secondary education only 
took place up to this year. Residual analysis may be used to identify out-
performers or under-performers in a given context (DE VRIES, 2009; DE 
VRIES, LAKO, 2009). The technique is based on the attributes of a normally 
distributed population, where 99% of the standardized residues – ZRE – 
are located between 2.5 and -2.5; thus, within this range, variations 
observed are deemed random. Cases with standardized residues above 3 
and below -3, however, are considered outliers; the former indicates the 
out-performers and the latter the under-performer’s ones. 
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Figure 2 shows the final results of residual analysis; only 
municipalities presenting ZRE scores above 3 and below -3 in at least 
two waves of data have been taken into consideration. By this criterion, 
seven municipalities may be classified as outperformers: Barra do 
Chapéu (São Paulo [Sao Paulo State]), Boa Vista do Tupim (Bahia), Cajuru 
(São Paulo), Itápolis (São Paulo), Lajinha (Minas Gerais), Ouro Verde 
(São Paulo) and Santa Rita d’Oeste (São Paulo). The only municipality 
consistently showing a worse-than-expected performance was Toritama 
(State of Pernambuco). It should be pointed out that the number of out-
performers and under-performers varied greatly year-on-year. In 2005, 
16 municipalities had ZREs above 3, while nine had ZREs below-3; in 
2007, 35 municipalities had better-than-expected performances, with 
ZREs above 3, and only four had ZREs below -3; finally, in 2009, 31 
municipalities had ZREs above 3, and three had ZREs below -3. It should 
also be noted that six of the seven out-performers are in Brazil’s most 
highly-developed region, the south-east.
FIGURE 2
STANDARD RESIDUES (ZRE) FOR MUNICIPALITIES WITH CONSISTENT 
PERFORMANCE
Source: Author’s elaboration.
Table 4 presents a comparison of school performance and 
demographic and socio-economic parameters for the seven out-
performers. Except for Barra do Chapéu (São Paulo) and Boa Vista 
do Tupim (Bahia), the remainder has fewer than 36% of their 
residents  classed as poor; furthermore, all out-performers are small 
or very small municipalities. The relatively low level of poverty found 
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among most out-performers bolsters the argument that poverty is 
indeed a very important factor in determining school performance.
Since few municipalities showed a consistent performance, this 
shows that IDEB scores are also subject to the temporary fluctuations 
seen in the performance tests of other countries. Kane and Staiger 
(2002) note that the results of school performance through evaluation 
tests, apart from showing fluctuations due to sampling variations, 
have several other sources of variation. These variations “may cause 
temporary fluctuations in the performance of an entire school, such as 
a dog barking in the school parking lot, bad weather on exam day or 
curriculum differences that interact in different ways with the types of 
exam used” (p. 95). Since nearly 55% of Brazil’s municipalities have no 
more than three municipal schools, momentary fluctuations in a single 
school may affect the IDEB score for the whole municipality.
TABLE 4
MUNICIPALITIES WITH BETTER-THAN-EXPECTED SCHOOL PERFORMANCE 
(MUNICIPAL SCHOOLS; RESULTS FOR THE 4TH YEAR OF PRIMARY EDUCATION)
sTaTe MUNICIPALITY IDEB2005* ideB2007* ideB2009* POVERTY** n. HaB.
sP
Barra do 
Chapéu
6,8 6,9 5,4 65,47 5.244
sP Cajuru 5,2 7 8,6 15,93 23.371
sP Itápolis 6,3 8,1 6,7 18,31 40.051
sP Ouro Verde 5,7 6,4 6,3 33,82 7.800
sP
Santa Rita 
d’Oeste
5,8 7,2 5,5 30,38 2.543
Mg Lajinha 4,5 6,3 7,5 35,94 19.609
Ba
Boa Vista do 
Tupim
2,2 4,8 5,8 80,25 17.991
* The national average for IDEB for municipal schools up to the 4th year was: 2005 = 3.4; 2007 = 
4; 2009 = 4.4. ** Percentage of people with a per capita household income less than half of the 
minimum wage in force in August 2000. The universe of individuals is limited to those living in 
permanent private households.
Source: Author’s elaboration.
ANALYSIS OF PARTIAL CORRELATIONS
How far can input factors – in other words, school-relevant 
factors – explain school performance in Brazil? In order to assess this 
question, we used partial correlations to examine the impact of the 
number of primary education teachers in a municipality with university 
diplomas (BRAZIL, s. d.[e]) on IDEB, controlling statistically for the 
correlation, in order to discount the effect of poverty. The results are 
presented in table 5, and show that teacher’s qualifications – at least 
qualifications corresponding to university diplomas – explain less 
than 1% of the variation in IDEB scores when the effect of poverty is 
discounted. This suggests that the impact of poverty is strong enough 
to neutralize the effect of input factors commonly associated with 
educational quality. A discussion of the so-called Heyneman-Loxley 
effect is highly relevant for this issue.
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TABLE 5
PARTIAL CORRELATIONS FOR IDEB SCORES AND THE PERCENTAgE OF 
PRIMARY TEACHERS WITH UNIVERSITY DIPLOMAS (CONTROLLINg FOR THE 
POVERTY VARIABLE); MUNICIPALITIES UP TO 50,000 INHABITANTS
4TH YEAR 8TH YEAR
Year Partial R r2 Partial R r2
Municipal 
schools
2005 0,077c 0,006 0,080c 0,006
2007 0,091c 0,008 n.s. –
2009 0,088c 0,008 0,063b 0,004
state 
schools
2005 0,054a 0,003 0,040a 0,002
2007 0,065b 0,004 0,052b 0,003
2009 0,069b 0,005 0,086c 0,007
(a) p < 0.05; (b) p = 0.001; (c) p < 0.0001; (n.s.) not significant.
Source: Author’s elaboration.
Heyneman and Loxley (1983), using data gathered in 1970, 
found that the quality of schools – measured by input factors – was 
more important in explaining students’ performance in low-income 
countries than in high-income countries. The authors argued that in 
those countries the effect of families’ social and economic conditions 
would be partially counterweighted by school quality factors. The so-
called Heyneman-Loxley effect is therefore, typical of less-developed 
countries and may be explained by the relative scarcity of supply 
of education: if education is a service with low levels of supply, 
students would be more motivated, whatever their socio-economic 
level, resulting in a better-than-expected performance for the socio-
economic standard of the country. Baker, Goesling and Letendre (2002) 
used a mix of high and low-income countries similar to that used in 
the Heyneman and Loxley study, seeking to ascertain whether the 
conclusions of the latter authors were still valid in the 1990s. Their 
results showed that the Heyneman-Loxley effect had disappeared, and 
the effect of families’ socio-economic background was similar to what 
was seen in the classic study by Coleman et al. (1966). The authors 
observed that “for all the countries in the sample, variables pertaining 
to families’ socio-economic circumstances are much more significant 
in predicting school performance than variables pertaining to the 
school’s resources” (2002, p. 303-304). Furthermore, the authors stated 
that the effect observed in the 1970s probably reflected inequalities 
in access to education. In fact, when places in schools are scarce, only 
students in better socio-economic circumstances have access to these 
places. Once the scarcity is eliminated, the impact of this variable 
becomes apparent. For this reason, the idea that public schools were 
much better in the past should be treated with caution: the scarcity 
of places masked the impact of socio-economic conditions, which 
is no longer possible after access to primary education has become 
universal.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL POLICIES
In this context – Brazil has almost achieved universal access to primary 
education and aims to improve school performance – what are the most 
suitable policies? As it has been mentioned, practically all educational 
policies have ignored the impact of the socio-economic factor on school 
performance. While the United States and the United Kingdom are 
among the few developed countries that have adopted accountability 
policies associated with market mechanisms, the World Bank has 
advocated universal adoption of these policies. In a study available 
on the institution’s website, Hanushek and Wöβmann (2007) propose 
that educational policies must combine three inter-related strategies in 
order to improve the quality of school learning: to favor competition 
between schools; to give schools greater autonomy and to introduce an 
accountability system. 
It is impossible within the scope of this study to present an 
exhaustive review of the ongoing controversy as to the use of market 
mechanisms in educational policies; for our purposes, it is enough to 
point out two aspects of the argument. Firstly, if there is no empirical 
evidence that a school’s characteristics can improve school performance – 
and in fact, this is the conclusion of a wide-ranging review of studies 
carried out by Hanushek (2003) – competition between schools does 
not make sense. For there to be competition one must presuppose that 
certain schools have superior characteristics to others. However, as the 
Coleman Report showed, differences between schools are reflections of 
differences in students’ socio-economic status rather than of schools’ 
intrinsic features (COLEMAN et al., 1966). In the case of Brazil and other 
large middle-income countries with thousands of small impoverished 
municipalities, promoting competition between schools is simply 
unfeasible owing to the opportunity costs involved. In Brazil 54.7% of 
municipalities have up to three municipal schools; these municipalities 
obviously do not have the human, financial or administrative resources 
for competition between schools to make the slightest sense. 
The two other recommendations made by Hanushek and 
Wöβmann – autonomy and setting up an accountability system – 
are hard to argue against, since the terms have acquired positive 
connotations in public opinion and even among certain specialists, 
shielding them against criticism. However, it should be noted that 
in the proposal put forward by Hanushek and Wöβmann, autonomy 
merely means “the autonomy to compete”; not the autonomy to adopt 
teaching practices and curriculum content suitable to the social setting 
in which the school is located. Within the proposal grounded on market 
mechanisms, autonomy presupposes competition since it only exists in 
order for “the best school to win”. 
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Accountability policies  – whether associated with market 
mechanisms or otherwise – have begun to be criticized by specialists, 
particularly those assessing the U.S. No child left behind – NCLB 
program. Ravitch (2010) argues that one of the consequences of NCLB 
has been a narrowing of curriculum content since school performance 
evaluations have focused on reading skills and mathematics; studies 
have shown that several schools have cut the hours dedicated to 
other subjects such as social studies and sciences in order to include 
training classes for the state and federal evaluation examinations. 
Another negative consequence has been fraud in evaluation exams. In 
the NCLB program, the consequences of poor school performance may 
be dramatic, including not only the loss of federal resources, but also 
the closure of schools and the firing of teachers; for this reason, the 
policy is being called high-stakes testing. Therefore, fraud has become 
“attractive’. According to Ravitch (2010), manipulation of performance 
test results has ranged from refusing to enroll students from families 
with low socio-economic indicators, through the prior selection of those 
students who will take evaluation tests, to fraud pure and simple. In 
July 2011, The Economist published an article on the fraud scandal in 
evaluation tests in schools in Atlanta, Georgia. Several types of fraud 
were identified according to the article. 
“Some teachers gave pupils answers. Some teatchers filled in 
answers themselves. Some pointed to answers wilhe standing over 
pupils’ desks. Others let low-scoring children sit near – and copy 
from – higher-scoring ones. One group of teachers had a test-
-changing party over the weekend” (ATLANTA’S, 2011, p. 32)
This fraud has far-reaching consequences since it erodes the 
credibility of the performance indicators. As “Campbell’s Law” puts it: 
“The more a quantitative social indicator is adopted for decision-making 
in public policy, the greater will be the pressure toward corruption and 
the more this indicator will be used to distort and corrupt the social 
processes it should monitor” (CAMPBELL, in RAVITCH, 2010, location 
2947-2955).
The experience of public accountability policies in Brazil is still 
too recent for any conclusive evaluation of its results. However, the 
adoption of certain elements that are typical of high-stakes testing may 
entail consequences similar to those previously observed in NCLB. IDESP, 
the school performance indicator used to assess schools in the State of 
São Paulo, is already being used to distribute monetary incentives to 
teachers and employees through the Bonificação por resultados program 
[Bonuses for results] (SÃO PAULO, 2008). According to the program’s 
guidelines, each state school is given a yearly target, which is calculated 
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assuming the expected performance level of all schools in 2030 (SÃO 
PAULO, 2011a). The schools most highly impacted by poverty – in other 
words, those with the lowest indicators – are precisely those that will 
have to show the biggest annual progress (SÃO PAULO, 2011b). Like 
other accountability policies, the bonuses for the results of a given 
program ignore the impact of poverty and the variation in the results 
of evaluation examinations, which may occur owing to factors beyond 
schools’ control. That is why the program runs the risk of confusing 
teachers and discouraging the adoption of pedagogical practices that 
can only produce aimed results in the long-term. 
Despite the redistributing component that characterized 
FUNDEF – which was maintained in FUNDEB, the fund that succeeded it 
in 2007 (BRASIL, 2007) – the federal government’s educational policies 
have also given scant attention to the impact of poverty on school 
performance. Still, it has undertaken to invest R$1 billion annually in 
a program to provide undergraduate-level distance-education courses 
to primary teachers (MEC, 2009). Traditional educational programs, 
however, were not expanded. The Programa nacional do livro didático – 
PNLD [National Textbook Program], begun in 1929, Brazil’s oldest 
program to enhance school performance, spent R$577.6 million on 
books and R$112.8 million to distribute them to public schools (BRASIL, 
s.d.[c]). Not much is known about the impact of this program on student 
performance throughout Brazil, but evidence from studies conducted in 
other countries suggests that the availability of books is an important 
factor in school performance (HEYNENMAN, FARREL, SEPULVEDA-
STUARDO, 1981). Fuchs and Woessmann (2004) showed that there is a 
positive association between the presence of books at home and school 
performance. However, PNLD rules demand that students – except for 
those enrolled in the first year of primary education – return used books 
at the end of the school year; after three years the school is authorized 
to purchase new books and the old are discarded. This evidence, albeit 
incipient, suggests that PNLD should be expanded to allow students to 
keep their textbooks. Such a program could be tested on a small-scale 
and if results are positive could then be extended to all public schools. 
Another recurring problem is that educational policies in Brazil are 
usually “all or nothing” and, also, rarely introduced after pilot projects 
to test the impact of specific policies. 
In the context of this discussion, Programas Condicionais de 
Transferência de Renda – CTR [conditional income transfer programs], 
which became widespread in Brazil in the mid-1990s, are worth 
mentioning (ANDREWS, 2004). The Bolsa Família [Family Allowance], 
launched in 2003 based on the Bolsa Escola [School Allowance] 
experience, is currently the world’s largest income transfer program, 
giving monetary subsidies to more than 12.5 million families (BRASIL, 
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s.d.[d]). The program standards lay down that beneficiaries must keep 
their children at school until the age of 15; they must also meet other 
health-related demands. However, the impact of the Bolsa Família on 
dropout rates has been small. Glewwe and Kassouf (2008) concluded that 
the Bolsa Família accounted for a 0.5 percentage point fall in dropout 
rates in the first four years of elementary school and 0.4 percentage 
points for the last four years of primary schooling. The authors argue 
that the effect of the program on the dropout rate among children 
of beneficiary families is up to three times greater than the observed 
overall impact, since only one-third of Brazilian children are served 
by the program. Nonetheless, the Bolsa Família has an unimportant 
impact on school dropout rates: 1.5 percentage points for the 4th year 
and 1.2 for the 8th year. This would suggest that municipalities are not 
enforcing the conditions of the program as the federal government 
requires. The Bolsa Família has been considered highly efficient in 
reducing poverty and inequality, achieving important results in the 
North-east (HOFFMANN, 2006).
Even if an improvement in inspecting the program led to a 
significant fall in school dropout rates, one cannot expect a similar 
impact on school performance measured by standardized tests, since 
such programs do not affect the cultural conditions associated with 
poverty, above all low levels of schooling among students’ parents. 
CTR programs could have a favorable impact in the long run, since 
one expects that increased schooling would have a positive impact on 
the next generation, creating a virtuous cycle. The Bolsa Família would 
need to be able to have a beneficial impact on school dropout rates for 
this to occur, which does not seem to have been the case to date. As 
we have noted, 60% of children are currently not completing the eight 
years of basic education. 
We have seen that municipal school performances have 
improved since 2005, and some of the goals established for 2009 were 
achieved earlier than expected. Some hypotheses might explain these 
results. From 2003 to 2009, poverty fell by 45% in Brazil, above all due 
to increased formal employment (DANTAS, NERI, 2010). One initial 
hypothesis, therefore, is that the reduction of poverty had a relatively 
rapid impact on educational performance. However, this estimate was 
based on data for metropolitan regions (NERI, 2008, 2009); it is not 
yet known how much poverty fell in small municipalities. Another 
hypothesis capable of explaining improved IDEB scores is that schools 
have become familiar with the structure of the Prova Brasil (multiple-
choice tests) and are coaching their students before applying the tests. A 
third hypothesis has to do with the same phenomenon as was observed 
in the United States – adulteration of evaluation test results. Finally, there 
is the hypothesis that teaching quality is actually improving and that this 
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is being reflected in the results of school performance evaluation. In this 
case, these educational improvements – we do not know which ones 
they are – could be managing to break down the barrier of students’ 
socio-economic backgrounds. It would be reasonable to suppose that all 
four hypotheses are partially true, but we do not know which of them 
has had the greatest impact on the results observed since 2005. Without 
further studies to identify the reasons behind the improvements seen in 
recent years, interpretation of the IDEB results and other performance 
indicators becomes increasingly difficult. The creation of IDEB and its 
dissemination throughout almost all of Brazil’s schools is fundamental 
to enable educational policies to be prepared, but educational authorities 
must remain attentive to inherent constraints and risks in the use of 
indicators in creating public policies, above all with regard to high-stakes 
testing-based strategies. Be that as it may, the impact of these socio-
economic factors on school performance cannot be ignored.
CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL REMARKS
In this study, we have analyzed the impact of poverty on school 
performance in Brazilian municipalities, considering the context of 
the municipalization of basic education in Brazil after the introduction 
of FUNDEF. Analysis of the data has shown that municipal schools, 
accounting for most of the increase in enrollments in basic education for 
the period under consideration, are more seriously affected by poverty 
than state schools. This result should not be ascribed only to their own 
characteristics, but rather to the fact that FUNDEF created incentives for 
municipalities to open new schools, increasing the number of enrollments 
and bringing children from poorer families into the school system. The 
universal access to education promoted by FUNDEF established enhanced 
education quality as the next step, laying the foundations of a goal that its 
intrinsic strategy – increased enrollments – will be unable to attain. This 
has implications for the municipalization of education: in itself, it cannot 
promote improvements in school performance. 
Given the results of the present study, we can perceive the 
importance of the conclusions of the Coleman Report (1966) for Brazil 
and other emerging economies. Brazil can no longer be deemed a 
“developing” country, but it is still a country marked by poverty and 
inequality. Brazil’s socio-economic context is closer today to what is 
found in the USA and other developed countries because these countries 
themselves have become poorer and more unequal in recent decades. 
So, the socio-economic background, both in these countries and in 
Brazil, is still the main explanatory factor for school performance levels. 
For 30 years, the theory of human resources supported the thesis that 
poverty could simply be overcome through mass education systems 
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(EASTERLIN, 1981). Today, its advocates have begun to argue that 
poverty can only be overcome by improving the quality of education 
(HANUSHEK, WÖßMANN, 2007). However, it should be recognized that 
improved quality of education also entails overcoming poverty. 
The impact of poverty on school performance is a great challenge 
for the Brazilian political class. On the one hand, current education 
policies are geared towards improving input factors or – what is 
more troubling – to assume that teachers’ accountability is the key to 
promoting quality in education. Nevertheless, if the impact of poverty is 
not taken into consideration, educational policies in Brazil run the risk of 
adhering to typical “symbolic policy” practices, in other words, they will 
be increasingly driven by public opinion expectations rather than by the 
objective fundamentals of social reality (DE VRIES, 2010). This will be very 
likely limit alternatives for public policies. Local economic development 
programs could possibly have a greater impact on school performance 
than educational policies based on input factors or on the accountability of 
schools and teachers. If the belief that governments should resort only to 
the latter type of policies persists, the array of possible interventions will 
remain limited. At a certain moment of the debate, an expectation was 
created that educational policies should produce short-term results. This 
led politicians to rapidly “cycle through” educational policies, discarding 
supposedly inefficient policies for novelties. However, “novelties” wear 
off and the next will soon need to be invented. 
Let us be clear: improvement in school performance is a desirable 
goal, but quality schools are an even more desirable goal. Perhaps what 
has been missing in this debate is a consideration of education as a social 
right, in its most basic meaning. All Brazilian students should have the 
right to qualified teachers and access to textbooks, to study in pleasant 
settings, and to enjoy other features associated with good schools. 
These characteristics must be promoted by policy-makers as a way of 
providing every child and adolescent with opportunities. Educating is a 
complex activity and must not be carried out merely by manipulating a 
dozen or so inputs as a production function, or by holding schools and 
teachers accountable. In brief, performance indicators must be seen as 
ancillary instruments of educational policies and not as parameters to 
which the policies must unthinkingly submit.
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